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amendment was adopted. In spite of the strong role the State Department of Education and the State Board of Education have under
the amendment-approving projects and issuing bonds-major control still remains at the local level. That is an important factor requiring active public interest in school financing.
LEO WO'rrZKY

CASE COMMENTS
ADOPTION: REQUISITE STATUTORY CONSENT
Pugh v. Barwick, 56 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1952)
Pursuant to a letter to petitioners offering her three-month-old
illegitimate son for adoption, Mrs. Pugh, then an unmarried girl of
nineteen years, delivered the child to them. A year and a half later,
accompanied by her newly-married husband, she went to petitioners
and requested the return of the child. Petitioners refused and, having
taken no formal steps to legally adopt the child, filed this petition
for his adoption. Joined by her husband, the mother filed an answer
to the petition. As provided by statute1 the Welfare Board reviewed
the case and recommended that respondents be awarded the custody
of the child. In the course of the proceeding in the trial court the
respondents moved that the petition be dismissed on the ground,
inter alia, that the necessary consent of the natural parent, required
by statute, 2 had not been procured. Upon the trial court's granting of
the petition, respondents appealed. HELD, the letter offering the
child and the subsequent delivery of the child were sufficient to constitute the consent required in our adoption statutes. Decree affirmed.
Adoption, unknown at common law, exists today solely by virtue
of statute. 3 Florida passed its first general adoption statutes in 1885, 4
'FIA. STAT. §72.15
2FLA. STAT. §72.14

(1951).
(1951).

3

1n re Palmer's Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937).
4Fla Laws 1885, c. 3594. With extremely minor changes the same acts were
FLA. STAT. C. 72 (1941).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss4/6

2

Michaels: Adoption: Requisite Statutory Consent
CASE COMMENTS
adoption prior to that time being possible only by special enactment. 5
At that time a prohibition was also placed in the Florida Constitution
against enactment of a special adoption law.6 This provision is still
in effect. These first adoption laws merely provided that the judges
of the circuit courts were empowered to legalize the adoption of any
child by any person who applied therefor.7 Seemingly there were no
restrictions, though it was held in Re Whetstone8 that in order to be
constitutional 9 adoption statutes must be construed so as to authorize
an adoption only in cases in which: (1) the natural parents consent;
(2) they have abandoned the child;1 (3) they have been permanently
deprived of the custody of the child;11 or (4) it is for the child's best
interest that it be taken from their custody by some judicial proceeding of which they have notice.
After the passage of the early general acts and excepting the Whetstone qualifications, little change took place in our adoption laws for
almost sixty years. It was not until 1943 that these loosely drawn acts
1were repealed and our present adoption laws passed. 2
Under the present statutes the circuit court, on the chancery side,' 3
acquires jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding in two ways: either
(1) the petition for adoption is accompanied by the written consent
of the parents executed in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public or other officer authorized by law
to take acknowledgments,' 4 or (2) the parents are given notice of the
proceedings.15
The adoption proceeding is a three-step process. First the court
acquires jurisdiction by giving the parents the opportunity to defend
5Some examples of these may be seen in Fla. Laws 1883, cc. 3543-3555.
Ofr..
CONsr. Art. I, §20.
7FA. STAT. §72.01

(1941).

8137 Fla. 712, 188 So. 576 (1939). The necessary conditions set out in the
Whetstone case were upheld and cited as controlling in Fielding v. Highsmith,
152 Fla. 837, 13 So.2d 208 (1943).
oThe specific constitutional requirement is not indicated, but there is a strong
inference that the due process clause is involved.
lOCf. Streets v. Gammarino, 59 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1952).
2"Fielding v. Highsmith, 152 Fla. 837, 840, 13 So.2d 208, 209 (1943), adds "by
a competent court having jurisdiction of the parents and the child."
12FLA. STAT. c. 72 (1951).
'SFLA. STAT. §72.21 (1951).
14FLA. STAT. §72.14 (1951).
16FL. STAT. §72.13 (1951).
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their rights.-6 These rights are then adjudicated; the conditions set
out in the Whetstone case present the only Florida law on this point.
Finally the court decides if the adoption is for the child's best interest.
It is at this stage that the court tests the competency of the adopting
parents. All three steps must be met or a valid decree cannot be
rendered.
Statutory requirements of consent in adoption proceedings generally pertain to the consent to adoption, the consent constituting a
waiver of the parental rights to the child. Such provisions are often
strictly construed because of the serious consequences of consent, and
many authorities favor close adherence to the formal requirements.'There is a judicial tendency today, however, to relax statutory require8
ments whenever the best interests of the child so demand.'
The Florida statute appears to have a two-fold application, presenting, it would seem, something of an anomaly. Section 72.14 expressly
states that consent to adoption is sufficient to constitute a waiver of
notice of adoption proceedings. It therefore affects the jurisdictional
aspect of adoption, a step one proceeding. Consent under the statute,
however, has been held to constitute a waiver of the parental rights-9
- in other words, to spell out statutorily the requisite consent in step
two of an adoption proceeding, which was previously stated only in
the Whetstone decision.
In the instant case the Court adopted a loose concept of consent
20
by stating:
"It is true . . that formal consent of the natural mother was
not had and obtained, as required by our applicable statutes.
The ... letter, coupled with the actual delivery of the custody
of the child.., with her permission or consent to the adoption,
may in this particular instance be sufficient to meet the requirements of our adoption statutes."
16FLA. STAT. §§72.13, 72.14 (1951).

-In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161 (1912); Foley v. Carnesi, 123 Colo.
533, 232 P.2d 186 (1951); Adoption of Capparelli, 180 Ore. 41, 175 P.2d 153 (1946);
Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294, 204 S.W.2d 859 (1948); 4 VERNMER, AMaMCA.
FAMILY LAWS 396 (1936).
l8Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906); Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo.

173, 33 Pac. 23 (1893).
lDin re Adoption of Long, 56 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1952).
2oAt p. 126.
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Whether or not a liberal construction of adoption laws is generally
desirable when the statute affects the parental rights to a child, the
liberal construction of the Florida statutes is believed to be unfortunate. Because our consent provision applied both to the substantive
rights of parents and to their right to notice of an adoption proceeding, a loose interpretation of Section 72.14 may result in an informal
waiver of notice. Even if parents have informally waived their parental rights, it seems desirable that they be given notice of the adoption
proceedings.21 Their rights to the child are being finally adjudicated
and a change of fortune may in some situations result in a change
of attitude toward adoption; in fact, it is not unheard of to withdraw
consent even after an interlocutory decree of adoption.22
No one can say with certainty what the Florida law of consent
is, for a few weeks after the decision of the instant case the Court
recognized the necessity for construing the consent provision strictly
in the case of In re Adoption of Long,23 and it was careful to point out
that the consent instrument satisfied all the statutory requirements.
What, then, is the Florida law of consent? What constitutes a valid
consent sufficient to give the court jurisdiction in the absence of
notice and also to constitute voluntary relinquishment of the natural
parents' rights? These questions apparently will remain unanswered
unless the Legislature acts. Our adoption laws should be more comprehensive; their very brevity creates confusion. Rather than forcing
reliance on the general conditions set forth in Re Whetstone24 in determining whether a parent has relinquished his or her right to the
child, the Legislature should provide definite rules governing both
relinquishment and notice. The judiciary in attempting to utilize
what is available in the way of enactments will continue without any
great fault on its part to fail to clarify the law involved. The adoption machinery we have is wholly inadequate. There is need for a
dear-cut statutory revision.
BURTON M. MICHAEIS

2lHumphrey, Appellant, 137 Mass. 84 (1884); In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197
S.W. 1097 (1917); cf. Foley v. Carnesi, 123 Colo. 533, 232 P.2d 186 (1951).
22Adoption of Capparelli, 180 Ore. 41, 175 P.2d 153 (1946).
2356 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1952).
24137 Fla. 712, 188 So. 576 (1939).
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